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Abstract
In ubiquitous computing devices, users tend to store some valuable
information in their device. Even though the device can be borrowed by
the other user temporarily, it is not safe for any user to borrow or lend
the device as it may result the private data of the user to be public. To
safeguard the user data and also to preserve user privacy we propose the
technique of ownership authentication transfer. The user who is willing
to sell the device has to transfer the ownership of the device under sale.
Once the device is sold and the ownership has been transferred, the old
owner will not be able to use that device at any cost. Either of the users
will not be able to use the device if the process of ownership has not been
carried out properly. This also takes care of the scenario when the device
has been stolen or lost, avoiding the impersonation attack. The proposed
protocol has been modeled and verified using Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) and is found to
be safe.
1 Introduction
A ubiquitous computing (Ubicomp) or pervasive computing environment is
imagined as a system with numerous invisible computers, sensors and actua-
tors interacting with the user devices such as PDAs, Laptops, Mobile Phones
etc. Data about the individuals who are a part of the ubiquitous environment
is constantly being generated, transmitted, manipulated and stored. The user
data present in the environment (in device or servers) is very sensitive. Pro-
tecting private data of every user in the environment is a major concern. Also
in the this era of the mobile environment the user owns more than one portable
devices like the PDAs, Laptops, Mobile Phones etc. with varying computing
capabilities in order to access the variety of services that are being provided by
the service providers. At times the user may tend to sell the device he/she owns.
∗Sanjay Singh is with the Department of Information and Communication Technology,
Manipal Institute of Technology, Manipal University, Manipal-576104, INDIA, E-mail: san-
jay.singh@manipal.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:1
20
8.
17
12
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  8
 A
ug
 20
12
Since the device consists of the valuable information of the user and also will
have the access to the valuable information present at the server, care should
be taken to delete or remove the information of the previous owner and store
the details of the new owner in the device as well as in the server. In spite of
our best efforts, we were not able to find any similar protocols other than those
cited below as part of literature review.
Paulo Tam and Jan Newmarch [1] in their work have suggested the concept
of transferring the ownership of the device. The owner (old owner) of the device
will send the message to the device itself that it is being bought by the other
user (new owner). The device will send the message to the new owner saying
that its ownership is about to change to you (new user), do you accept or reject.
The new owner sends the response to the device. And the object will in turn
send an acknowledgment on the status of the transfer to the old owner. However
when the owner of the device is selling the device to the new owner, sending
the message to the device itself does not seem feasible. Moreover to which
device of the user, the device under sale is sending the message is not known.
It is agreeable if the new owner of the device has one more device under his
ownership. But if the user has no other device previously and it is his/her first
device then there is no possibility for the device under sale to send the message
to its new owner asking his consent on the ownership transfer. In ubiquitous
environment the ownership transfer has to be informed to the central server
instead of informing to the device under sale.
Jurgen Bohn [2] has mentioned that the user can borrow or lend the device
to his friend or the stranger. The data of a particular user can be retrieved from
the instant personalization server at any time and from anywhere for a specific
time. Once the time limit is exceeded, the session will be ended and the user
needs to quit the session or restart it. After using the device, the user can release
the device and return it back to the owner of the device. But the very basic idea
of sharing the personal device with a friend or a stranger may cause information
to be public. This could be due to the other user being malicious (intentionally
causing harm) by installing some kind of software which can record the data of
the user or simply careless (unintentionally installing malicious software which
can save the users data). Also due attention should be paid to the fact that the
device could come with old data, if the transfer is incomplete due to technical
reasons such as network congestion or lack of connectivity. The owner of the
device may also turn out to be malicious with respect to the other user. The
user may install a software that records the all the data that has been retrieved
and sent from that device before encryption and after decryption. Later the
user may be subjected to the impersonation attack. Moreover when the time
limit is exceeded, there are chances that the user may have to end the session
or restart it due to network latencies or unresponsive server when the user is
trying to retrieve or release the data.
Yongming Jin et al [3] has described the transfer of RFID from the old
owner to the new owner. They define a protocol to safeguard the privacy of
the respective owners by putting the clean stop between the transactions of the
old and the new owners by means of a secret. The authors have suggested the
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use of RFIDs for the ownership transfer. But there are many security concerns
with respect to the RFID tags. One of the primary RFID security concern is
the illicit tracking of RFID tags. The tags are read by anyone in the world.
If the person who read the tag is malicious can pose a risk by either imper-
sonating the user or trying to manipulate the user data and use it for a wrong
purpose. RFIDs working at a shorter range are vulnerable to skimming and
eavesdropping. Even though certain RFID tags use cryptographic features, the
cost and power requirements are very high when compare to the simpler RFID
tags. Thus, the cost and power limitation has compelled some manufacturers
to implement cryptographic tags using substantially weak encryption schemes,
which are weak to resist the sophisticated attack. Moreover, the power avail-
able in the handheld devices is limited; these tags cannot be incorporated in the
devices.
Abdullah M. Alaraj [4] in his paper says that the users have to go to some
official office for buying or selling the merchandise and to complete the process
of ownership transfer. He also makes an assumption that the certain equipments
are required for ownership transfer and tries to improve the fairness by including
the transfer of money through the bank servers. But going to the an official office
that deals with buying or selling of merchandise is suitable only to the goods
like cars or for real estate. This scenario will not be suitable when applied to
ubiquitous computing devices. The process of ownership transfer requires only
a central key server and a device meant for sale. Submitting your bank details
to the third party might be risky at the time of payment. Even thought if
the system provides the best servers for transaction and promotes the users to
submit their bank details to the device in an office meant for buying and selling
of the merchandise. The device or the system in that office might turn out to
be malicious.
In this paper we propose the concept of ownership authentication transfer in
ubiquitous computing devices which takes care of transferring the ownership of
the device to the new owner. This is used when an old device is bought by the
user. This provides the security for the stolen device and avoids impersonation
attacks. It also addresses most of the limitations mentioned above.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the operation of
the proposed ownership transfer protocol. Section 3 discusses about the security
analysis of the proposed protocol followed by discussion in section 4. Finally
section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Device Ownership Authentication Transfer Pro-
tocol
In this paper we propose a secure and fair protocol for ownership transfer of
the ubiquitous computing device. The user who is buying an old device from
the other user has to undergo this process in order to successfully acquire the
ownership of the device and start using it in the ubiquitous environment.
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Assumption: The value or the price of the device has been agreed upon
between the users before transferring the ownership of the device.
Requisite: The users should be in physical proximity and the whole process
has to be carried out in the device which is under sale.
Table 1: Notations Used
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
EPCKS Encryption Using Public key of
CKS
CKS Central Key Server
NA nonce generated by A NB Nonce generated by B
IDA User ID or User Name of the user
A
IDB User ID or User Name of the user
B
PCKS Public key of the CKS Ack Acknowledgment
PWA Password of the User A TempID Temporary ID or Pseudo ID
OTC Ownership Transfer Confirma-
tion
OTR Ownership Transfer Request
The previously existing user should introduce the new owner of the device
to the CKS, in other words user A must transfer the ownership authentication
credentials to the new user B. Once the new owner is introduced, the CKS will
delete the credentials of the previous owner and then save the credentials of the
new owner for the same device. Once the ownership rights has been transfered
to the new user, the old user at any cost will not be able to use the device.
If in case the whole process of ownership transfer as mentioned below is not
completed, either of the users will not be able to use the device. This also takes
care of the scenario that if a device is stolen, the thief cannot use the device.
The proposed ownership transfer protocol for a given ubiquitous device has been
explained below.
1. UA → CKS : EPCKS (IDA‖PWA‖NA‖OTR)
The user A (Old User) sends the message to the CKS. The message con-
sists of the user A ID, password of the user A, nonce of the user A and
Ownership Transfer Request (OTR). This message is encrypted using the
public key of the CKS. OTR consists of the ID of the user selling the de-
vice, ID and nonce of the user buying the device. OTR is also encrypted
using the public key of the CKS, where OTR = EPCKS (IDA‖IDB‖NB).
In this step the user A will introduce user B to the CKS.
2. CKS → UA : Ticket
In response to the user A’s request for ownership transfer, the CKS sends
a ticket to the user A. The Ticket consists of the acknowledgment for
ownership transfer to the user B. The ticket is encrypted using the public
key of the CKS.
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Figure 1: Diagram Showing Device Ownership Transfer Process
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3. UB → CKS : EPCKS (IDB‖Ticket‖NB)
The user A will now hand over the device to the user B. Now the user
B sends his/her credentials to the CKS. The user needs to send user ID,
nonce and the ticket got by the user A. The ticket will be in the device
itself.
4. CKS → UB : ENA(Ownership Transfer Confirmation)
Once the CKS receives the credentials of User B, the CKS sends the
ownership transfer confirmation to the user B by encrypting it using nonce
of the user A. This message consists of the information about the money
to be transferred and the account details of the destination account.
5. UA → CKS : EPCKS (Ownership Transfer Confirmation)
The user B will hand over the device to the user A and the user A will
decrypt the message, read the acknowledgment and then he/she sends the
acknowledgment back to the CKS by encrypting it using the public key of
CKS. By sending the acknowledgment back to the CKS, he/she confirms
the ownership transfer of the device. Signing a particular message twice
is required to strike the fairness in the deal. There may be some chances
where either of the users may turn to be malicious. This is done in order
to obtain a confirmation from the user who is selling the device.
6. CKS → UB : ENB (TempID)
On receiving the message, CKS completes the ownership transfer of the
device by sending the temp ID to the user B. The temp ID is encrypted
using the nonce of the user B.
The above explained process of device ownership transfer is summarized in
the Fig. 1.
3 Security Analysis
The protocol has been modeled for validation using Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) [5] [6] [7]. AVISPA is a
tool aimed at developing a push-button, industrial-strength technology to an-
alyze a large-scale Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications. This
technology speeds up the development of the next generation of network pro-
tocols, improve their security features, and therefore increase the public ac-
ceptance of advanced, distributed IT applications based on them. AVISPA is
a commonly used verification tool to analyze the cryptographic features of the
protocols. AVISPA provides a language known as the High Level Protocol Spec-
ification Language (HLPSL) [8] to describe the security protocols and to specify
their intended security properties, as well as a set of tools to formally vali-
date them. It provides a modular and expressive formal language for specifying
protocols and their security properties, and integrates different back-ends that
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implement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques. In or-
der to analyze the proposed technique, the HLPSL specification for Ownership
Authentication Transfer is as given below.
role usera(
UA,C: agent,
Kcks : public_key,
SND,RCV : channel(dy))
played_by UA def=
local
State : nat,
Na: text,
Ida,Pwa,Otr,Otc: message
init
State := 0
transition
1. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State’:= 2 /\ Na’ := new()
/\ SND({Ida.Pwa.Otr.Na’}_Kcks)
2.State=2/\RCV({Otc}_Na)
/\request(UA,C,usera_server_na,Na’) =|>
State’:=8/\SND({Otc}_Kcks)
end role
----------------------------------------
role ck(
UA,C,UB : agent,
Kcks : public_key,
SND,RCV : channel(dy))
played_by C def=
local
State : nat,
Na,Nb: text,
Ida,Pwa,Otr,Otc,Tempid,Idb,T: message
init
State :=1
transition
1.State =1/\ RCV({Ida.Pwa.Otr.Na’}_Kcks)=|>
State’:=3/\SND(T)
2.State=3/\RCV({Idb.T.Nb’}_Kcks)=|>
State’:=7/\SND({Otc}_Na)
/\witness(C,UA,usera_server_na,Na)
3.State=7/\RCV({Otc}_Kcks)=|>
State’:=9/\SND({Tempid}_Nb)
/\witness(C,UB,userb_server_nb,Nb)
end role
----------------------------------------
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role userb(
C,UB : agent,
Kcks: public_key,
SND,RCV : channel(dy))
played_by UB def=
local
State : nat,
Nb: text,
Otc,Tempid,T,Idb: message
init
State := 4
transition
1. State = 4 /\ RCV(T) =|>
State’:= 8/\ Nb’:=new()
/\SND({Idb.T.Nb’}_Kcks)
2.State=8/\RCV({Tempid}_Nb)
/\request(UB,C,userb_server_nb,Nb’)=|>
State’:=10
end role
-----------------------------------
role session(
UA,C,UB: agent,
Kcks : public_key)
def=
local SA, SB, RA, RB : channel (dy)
composition
usera(UA,C,Kcks,SA,RA)
/\ userb(C,UB,Kcks,SB,RB)
/\ ck(UA,C,UB,Kcks,SB,RB)
end role
-------------------------------------
role environment()
def=
const
userb_server_nb,usera_server_na: protocol_id,
ks,ki: public_key,
a,b,c : agent
intruder_knowledge = {a,b,c,ks,ki}
composition
session(a,b,c,ks)
end role
------------------------------------------
goal
authentication_on userb_server_nb
authentication_on usera_server_na
end goal
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------------------------------------------
environment()
The result of the protocol simulation and verification for the Ownership
Authentication Transfer is shown in the Fig.2 and Fig.3
Figure 2: Screen Shot Showing the Details of the Result for Ownership Authen-
tication Transfer Phase
Figure 3: Screen Shot Showing the Protocol Simulation for Ownership Authen-
tication Transfer
In this phase the old user requests the CKS to start the ownership transfer
of the device. Both the new user and the old user will use the same device to
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interact with the CKS. The users will feed the details into the device that has
to be sent to the CKS. The messages that are going out of the device may be
intercepted by the intruder. But the intruder will not be able to decrypt the
message and know its contents as he/she will not be having the corresponding
keys to decrypt the message. Thus again the intruder attack fails and there
is no harm caused from the intruder to any of the authenticated entity in the
ubiquitous environment. The fifth and final HLPSL specification formalizes
AOT, in which there are two protocol roles: Device D and Central Key Server
C. The intruder I behaves either as D or as C, thus deceiving the other entities
in the network. But this kind of attack is not harmful as the intruder will not
be able to read the contents of the messages being exchanged.
1. D → I(”C”) : EPCKS (IDA‖PWA‖NA‖OTR)
2. C → I(”D”) : Ticket
3. D → I(”C”) : EPCKS (IDB‖Ticket‖NB)
4. C → I(”D”) : ENA(OTC)
5. D → I(”C”) : EPCKS (OTC)
6. C → I(”D”) : ENB (TempID)
The intruder attack is show in the Fig. 4. In this figure, we have shown only
the device under sale instead of the two users for better understanding.
Figure 4: Diagram Showing Intruder attack on Ownership Authentication
Transfer of the Devices
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4 Discussion
The Ubicomp device contains sensitive user data and also an easy access to
the data which are stored in the CKS, it is important that the user’s data is
protected. It is not secure for the user to borrow or lend his/her device for
any kind of transaction. The above proposed concept provides the transfer of
ownership devices securely for the users interested in buying the old devices.
If either of the users do not provide accurate information, the transfer will be
aborted. At this point, there may be a question arises as to how often the
ownership transfer can be done and can there be any temporary ownership
transfer. How often the ownership is transferred depends on the user of that
device. In developing countries people may tend to buy second hand devices, as
the price of the devices will meet their budget. The ownership transfer can be
done any number of times based on the interest of the users. On the other hand,
the mobiles or the hand held devices are sold and the ownership is transferred
permanently. There is nothing like temporary change in the ownership. Even
though the there is a need to change the ownership temporarily, it depends on
the mutual agreements between the new and the old user. Temporary ownership
transfer is purely at the users risk and it is not a part of this protocol. This
concept also takes care of the scenario where the device has been lost or stolen.
No person will be able to use the device other than its owner. Thus it avoids
impersonation attack.
The protocol is verified using Automated Validation of Internet Security Pro-
tocols and Applications (AVISPA). AVISPA provides a language known as the
High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) to describe the security
protocols and to specify their intended security properties, as well as a set of
tools to formally validate them. Experiments that were conducted on the vast
library of Internet security protocols have indicated that the AVISPA Tool is a
leading edge tool for Internet security protocol analysis. There are no other tool
that exhibit the same level of scope and robustness providing the excellent per-
formance and scalability to the best of our knowledge. The proposed protocol
was modeled and tested using AVISPA tool and was found to be safe.
5 Conclusion
By incorporating the concept of ownership authentication transfer in the ubiqui-
tous environment, we provide more security with respect to the owner’s sensitive
data and also to his device. The device can only be accessed by its owner. If
the device is stolen or lost the device cannot be accessed by the other users
unless the process of ownership transfer is completely done. Thus this adds up
the security in the ubiquitous environment. This also avoids the impersonation
attack.
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